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Abstract
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in de-
signing truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the
allocation rule once. We present a general reduction that takes any allocation rule which satisfies “cyclic
monotonicity” (a known necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness) and converts it to a truthful
mechanism using a single call to the allocation rule, with arbitrarily small loss to the expected social
welfare.
A prominent example for a multi-parameter setting in which an allocation rule can only be called
once arises in sponsored search auctions. These are multi-parameter domains when each advertiser has
multiple possible ads he may display, each with a different value per click. Moreover, the mechanism
typically does not have complete knowledge of the click-realization or the click-through rates (CTRs);
it can only call the allocation rule a single time and observe the click information for ads that were pre-
sented. On the negative side, we show that an allocation that is truthful for any realization essentially
cannot depend on the bids, and hence cannot do better than random selection for one agent. We then
consider a relaxed requirement of truthfulness, only in expectation over the CTRs. Even for that relaxed
version, making any progress is challenging as standard techniques for construction of truthful mecha-
nisms (as using VCG or an MIDR allocation rule) cannot be used in this setting. We design an allocation
rule with non-trivial performance and directly prove it is cyclic-monotone, and thus it can be used to
create a truthful mechanism using our general reduction.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we show that payment computation essentially does not present any obstacle in designing
truthful mechanisms, even for multi-parameter domains, and even when we can only call the allocation rule
once. This extends the result of [Babaioff et al., 2010] for single parameter domains to multi-parameter
domains. We present a general reduction that takes any allocation rule which satisfies “cyclic monotonicity”
(a known necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness) and convert it to a truthful mechanism using a
single call to the allocation rule, with arbitrarily small loss to the expected social welfare. The mechanism
does not compute the payments explicitly but rather charges random payments having the right expectation.
Such a reduction is particularly attractive as it can handle multi-parameter settings where it is impossible
to decouple the computation of the allocation from the actual execution of the allocation. In such situations,
the entire mechanism — including the payment computation — can only execute a single call to the allo-
cation rule. We call this the “no-simulation” constraint; it can arise when a mechanism interacts with the
environment, and the information revealed by the environment depends on the choices made by the alloca-
tion rule. The no-simulation constraint is a significant hurdle because the existing approaches to payment
computation require multiple calls to the allocation rule, with different vectors of bids.
Sponsored search auctions supply a prominent example of a multi-parameter setting with the no-simulation
constraint. In this setting each advertiser has multiple possible ads he is interested in displaying, each with
a different value per click, and the mechanism does not have complete knowledge of the click-realization or
the click-through rates (CTRs). Instead, it can only allocate ad impressions and observe the click informa-
tion for ads that were presented. The no-simulation constraint also arises in other contexts, such as packet
routing [Shnayder et al., 2012].
We note that our reduction — the multi-parameter transformation — has other uses beyond settings
with the no-simulation constraint. For example, it can also be used to speed up the computation of payments
in most multi-parameter mechanisms. Indeed, it has already been used for this purpose by two recent
papers. Jain et al. [2011] used it to speed up the payment computation for a mechanism that allocates batch
jobs in a cloud system. Huang and Kannan [2012] used it to compute payments for their privacy-preserving
procurement auction for spanning trees, which is based on the well-known “exponential privacy mechanism”
from prior work [McSherry and Talwar, 2007].
Sponsored search mechanisms with unknown CTRs. In the remainder of the paper we focus on the prob-
lem of designing truthful mechanisms for an archetypical multi-parameter setting with the no-simulation
constraint: sponsored search auctions with unknown click-through rates (CTRs). The difficulty in designing
such allocation rules stems from the fact that the welfare of a given allocation depends on clicks of the allo-
cated ads, which are unknown to the bidders and to the mechanism. This prevents us from using the VCG
mechanism since it depend on choosing a welfare-maximizing allocation. Yet, it is possible that welfare can
at least be approximated.
We focus on a simple single-shot ad auction in which the allocation rule unfolds over time (and the CTRs
are not known). As such, we contribute to a growing literature on ad auctions that unfold over time, as they
do in practice. The non-strategic version of our model is a well-understood variant of the multi-armed bandit
problem.
Mechanisms that are truthful for every realization of the clicks would be most attractive, as the strategic
behavior in such mechanisms would not depend on the agents’ beliefs about the process generating the clicks
— for example, the belief that clicks for each ad are i.i.d. from a fixed distribution. Such mechanisms were
constructed in Babaioff et al. [2009, 2010] for the single-parameter version of the problem. Unfortunately,
the multi-parameter setting is much harder. In the setting of sponsored search with multiple ads per bidder
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and unknown CTRs, we show that if the mechanism is required to be truthful for every realization of the
clicks, then it must be a trivial mechanism that outputs a fixed allocation (or distribution over allocations)
with no dependence on the bids.
In light of this negative result we consider a weaker notion of truthfulness. Assume that clicks are
stochastic (meaning that each ad has a CTR, and clicks are independent Bernoulli trials with the specified
click probabilities) but the CTRs are not known. The mechanism is required to be truthful for every vector
of CTRs; we call mechanisms with this property stochastically truthful. The VCG mechanism still cannot
be used as we cannot maximize the expected welfare without knowing the CTRs. An alternative is to use
a maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR) allocation rule combined with VCG-based payment rule, but we
show that for a natural family of MIDR allocation rules (in which the set of distributions the rule optimizes
over is independent of the CTRs) the performance of such rules is no better than randomly selecting an ad
to present.
There are a few examples in the literature of non-VCG-based truthful multi-parameter mechanisms in
which bidders freely choose an option from a hand-crafted menu of allocations and prices, e.g. [Bartal et al.,
2003, Dobzinski et al., 2006, Dobzinski and Nisan, 2011], but this technique similarly fails in our setting
because the bidders do not have a dominant strategy for choosing from such a menu when they do not know
their own CTRs.
Given all these negative results we turn to our multi-parameter transformation which reduces the problem
of designing truthful randomized mechanisms to the (seemingly simpler) problem of designing cyclically
monotone (CMON) allocation rules. In contrast to the negative result for truthfulness for every realization,
we directly craft an allocation rule that satisfies stochastic CMON; to our knowledge, the only previous paper
to successful apply this approach is [Lavi and Swamy, 2007]. Using the transformation we construct a
stochastically truthful mechanism that outperforms the naı¨ve random allocation for a single agent, when the
difference in value-per-impression of his ads is sufficiently large. While this is clearly just a small step, it
proves to be rather challenging, and relies heavily on the multi-parameter transformation described above.
Related work. Our earlier paper [Babaioff et al., 2010] considers the limited case of single parameter do-
mains. It introduced the technique of designing black-box transformations that perform implicit payment
computation while evaluating a given monotone allocation function only once. The same paper introduced
monotone allocation rules with strong welfare guarantees for sponsored search auctions with unknown
CTRs, by modifying multi-armed bandit algorithms to achieve the requisite monotonicity property. As
all the results in our earlier paper are limited to single-parameter settings, they only apply to sponsored
search when each advertiser has only one ad to display. In the present paper, we show that the black-box
transformation extends readily from single-parameter to multi-parameter settings, whereas extending the
results on sponsored search to multi-parameter settings is much more delicate, and in some cases (i.e. for
the strongest notion of truthfulness) outright impossible.
Wilkens and Sivan [2012] extended the results of [Babaioff et al., 2010] to multi-parameter domains
under some limitations. Their work provides a black-box transformation that allows implicit payment com-
putation when the allocation function is maximal-in-distributional-range (MIDR). While the MIDR property
is the most widely used method for achieving truthfulness in multi-parameter settings, it is not a necessary
condition for truthfulness. In fact several papers (including this one) depend on multi-parameter mecha-
nisms that are not MIDR. By presenting an implicit payment computation procedure that works whenever
there exists a truthful mechanism utilizing the given allocation function, we believe that we have posed the
multi-parameter transformation at the appropriate level of generality for future applications.
The literature contains surprisingly few examples of truthful multi-parameter mechanisms that are not
based on MIDR allocation rules. Mechanisms designed by Bartal et al. [2003], Dobzinski et al. [2006],
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Dobzinski and Nisan [2011] for various combinatorial auction domains make use of what might be termed
the pricing technique: each agent is allowed to choose freely from a menu of alternatives, each specifying
an allocation and price. The menu presented to a given agent may depend on the others’ bids, but it must
be carefully constructed so that self-interested agents each choosing from their own menu will never jointly
select an infeasible allocation. The taxation principle [Guesnerie, 1981, Hammond, 1979] implies that every
dominant-strategy truthful mechanism can actually be represented this way, provided that agents are able
to evaluate their own utilities for different allocations before the allocation is actually executed. In settings
with the no-simulation constraint, the taxation principle does not apply because agents can only evaluate
their utility ex post. In the sponsored search setting, for example, agents have no dominant strategy for
choosing from a menu listing bundles of ad impressions, because without knowing CTRs they can’t pre-
cisely determine the value of an impression; on the other hand, the mechanism is powerless to offer a menu
listing bundles of clicks, because there is no way to guarantee that a bidder who chooses a certain bundle
will receive the specified number of clicks.
Apart from mechanisms with MIDR allocation rules and those based on the pricing technique, we are
aware of only one other mechanism in the literature that is dominant-strategy truthful in a multi-parameter
setting: the scheduling mechanism of Lavi and Swamy [2007] for unrelated machines that have only two
possible processing times. Their mechanism, like ours, is designed by directly constructing an allocation
function that satisfies the cyclic monotonicity constraints.
2 Preliminaries
We study reductions from allocations to truthful mechanisms for multi-parameter domains. A CS-oriented
background on multi-parameter mechanisms can be found in Archer and Kleinberg [2008b,a], while an
Economics-oriented background can be found in Ashlagi et al. [2010]. Our main result holds for a very
general framework for multi-parameter mechanisms, described below, where agents’ types are defined as
mappings from outcomes to valuations. Our reduction invokes the allocation rule only once, which make it
particularly useful in domains in which the allocation rule cannot be invoked (or simulated) more than once
due to informational constraints.
Types, outcomes, and mechanisms. Multi-parameter mechanisms are defined as follows. There are n
agents and a set O of outcomes. Each agent i is characterized by his type xi : O → ℜ, where xi(o) is
interpreted as the agent’s valuation for the outcome o ∈ O. For each agent i there is a set of feasible types,
denoted Ti. Denote T = T1 × . . . × Tn and call it the type space; call Ti the type space of agent i. The
mechanism knows (n,O,T ), but not the actual types xi; each type xi is known only to the corresponding
agent i. Formally, a problem instance, also called a multi-parameter domain, is a tuple (n,O,T ).
A (direct revelation) mechanism M consists of the pair (A,P), whereA : T → O is the allocation rule
and P : T → ℜn is the payment rule. Both A and P can be randomized, possibly with a common random
seed. Each agent i reports a type bi ∈ Ti to the mechanism, which is called the bid of this agent. We denote
the vector of bids by b = (b1 , . . . ,bn) ∈ T . The mechanism receives the bid vector b ∈ T , selects an
outcome A(b), and charges each agent i a payment of Pi(b). The utilities are quasi-linear and agents are
risk-neutral: if agent i has type xi ∈ Ti and the bid vector is b ∈ T , then this agent’s utility is
ui(xi;b) = EM [xi(A(b))− Pi(b) ] . (1)
For each type xi ∈ Ti of agent i we use a standard notation (b−i,xi) to denote the bid vector bˆ such
that bˆi = xi and bˆj = bj for every agent j 6= i.
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Game-theoretic properties. A mechanism is truthful if for every agent i truthful bidding is a dominant
strategy:
ui(xi; (b−i,xi)) ≥ ui(xi;b) ∀xi ∈ Ti, b ∈ T . (2)
An allocation rule is called truthfully implementable if it is the allocation rule in some truthful mechanism.
A mechanism is individually rational (IR) if each agent i never receives negative utility by participating
in the mechanism and bidding truthfully:
ui(xi; (b−i,xi)) ≥ 0 ∀xi ∈ Ti, b−i ∈ T−i. (3)
The right-hand side in Equation (3) represents the maximal guaranteed utility of an “outside option”
(i.e., from not participating in the mechanism). For example, our definition of IR is meaningful whenever
this utility is 0, which is a typical assumption for most multi-parameter domains studied in the literature.
Note that if the mechanism is randomized, the above properties are defined in expectation over the
internal random seed. We can also define utility (and, accordingly, truthfulness and IR) for a given realization
of the random seed. We say a mechanism is universally truthful if it is truthful for all realizations of the
random seed; similarly for IR and other properties.
Our assumptions. We make two assumptions on the type space T :
• non-negative types: xi(o) ≥ 0 for each agent i, type xi ∈ Ti, each outcome o ∈ O.
• rescalable types: λxi ∈ Ti for each agent i, type xi ∈ Ti, and any parameter λ ∈ [0, 1]. (λxi denotes
the type x′i whose valuation for every outcome o satisfies x′i(o) = λxi(o).)
In particular, for each agent i there exists a zero type: a type xi ∈ Ti such that xi(·) ≡ 0. Let us say that
a mechanism is normalized if for each agent i, the expected payment of this agent is 0 whenever she submits
the zero type. For domains with non-negative types, it is desirable that all agents are charged a non-negative
amount; this is known as the no-positive-transfers property.
Dot-product valuations. An important special case is dot-product valuations, where the type x ∈ Ti of
each agent i can be decomposed as a dot product x(o) = βx · ai(o), for each outcome o ∈ O, where
βx, ai(o) ∈ ℜd are some finite-dimensional vectors. Here the term ai(o) is the same for all types x ∈ Ti
(and known to the mechanism), whereas βx is the same for all outcomes o ∈ O and is known only to agent
i. The term ai(o) is usually called an “allocation” of agent i for outcome o, and βx is called the “private
value”. Single-parameter domains correspond to the case d = 1.
Note that the type x of each agent i is determined by the corresponding private value βx, and his type
space Ti is determined by Di = {βx : x ∈ Ti} ⊂ ℜd. Because of this, in the literature on dot-product
valuations the term “type” often refers to βx. To avoid ambiguity, in this section we will refer to βx as
“private value” rather than “type”, and call D1 × . . . ×Dn the private value space.
In a domain with dot-product valuations, types are rescalable if and only if for each βx ∈ Di and each
λ ∈ [0, 1] it holds that λβx ∈ Di. In other words, if and only if the set Di is star-convex at 0. To ensure
non-negative types, it suffices to assume that Di ⊂ ℜd+ for each agent i, and all allocations are non-negative:
ai(o) ∈ ℜd+ for all o ∈ O.
Truthfulness characterization. We will use a characterization of truthful mechanisms via a property
called “cycle-monotonicity” (henceforth abbreviated as CMON). A (randomized) allocation rule A satis-
fies CMON if the following holds: for each bid vector b ∈ T , each agent i, each k ≥ 2, and each k-tuple
xi,0, xi,1 , . . . ,xi,k ∈ Ti of this agent’s types, we have
EA
[∑k
j=0 xi,j (oi,j)− xi, (j−1) mod k (oi,j)
]
≥ 0, where oi,j = A (b−i, xi,j) ∈ O. (4)
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Recall that we are using a general notion of agents’ types (and bids), which are defined as functions from
outcomes to real-valued valuations.
It is known that A is truthfully implementable if and only if it is cycle-monotone, in which case the
corresponding payment rule is essentially fixed.
Theorem 2.1 (Rochet [1987]). Consider an arbitrary multi-parameter domain (n,O,T ). A (randomized)
allocation rule A is truthfully implementable if and only if it is cycle-monotone. Assuming rescalable types,
for any cycle-monotone allocation rule A, a mechanism (A,P) is truthful and normalized if and only if
EA [Pi(b)] = EA
[
bi(A(b))−
∫ 1
t=0 bi(A(b−i, tbi)) dt
]
. (5)
This characterization generalizes a well-known truthfulness characterization of single-parameter mech-
anisms in terms of monotonicity, due to [Myerson, 1981, Archer and Tardos, 2001]. Recall that for single-
parameter domains, the type of each agent i is captured by a single number (the private value vi), and the
outcome pertinent to this agent is also captured by a single number (this agent’s allocation ai(o)). The bid
of agent i is represented by bi ∈ ℜ. Cycle-monotonicity is then equivalent to a much simpler property called
monotonicity: for each agent, fixing the bids of other agents, increasing this agent’s bid cannot decrease this
agent’s allocation. The payment formula (5) can also be simplified, e.g. for non-negative valuations it is
Pi(b) = biAi(b−i, bi)−
∫ bi
0 Ai(b−i, u) du. (6)
External seed. We allow allocation rules to receive input from the environment; a canonical example is pay-
per-click auctions where such input consists of user clicks. Formally, the allocation rule and the payment
rule depend on the additional argument ω which captures all relevant input from the environment. (To
simplify the notation, we keep the dependence on ω implicit.) We call ω the external seed, to distinguish
from the internal random seed of the mechanism. We assume that ω is an independent sample from some
fixed distribution Dext; this distribution may be unknown to the mechanism.
All game-theoretic properties defined above carry over to mechanisms with external seed if all expec-
tations are over both internal and external seed. In particular, Theorem 2.1 carries over with no other
modification.
We are primarily interested in properties that hold in expectation over the external seed, for all possible
distributions Dext over the external seed. The corresponding version of a given property P is called stochas-
tically P . For example, we are interested in mechanisms that are stochastically truthful, and this requires
the allocation rules to be stochastically CMON.
We also define a stronger version of truthfulness: one that holds for each realization of the external
seed. For each game-theoretic property P described above, such as truthfulness, IR and CMON, a version that
holds for each realization of the external seed will be called ex-post P . Theorem 2.1 holds for every given
realization of the external seed (but requires the allocation rule to satisfy ex-post CMON).
A crucial way in which the external seed is different from the internal randomness is that a given run
of the allocation rule might not observe the entire external seed. More precisely, runs of the allocation rule
on different bid vectors might observe different portions of the external seed. For example, if an ad is not
displayed to a given user, the mechanism does not observe whether this user would have clicked on this ad if
it were displayed. It follows that the mechanism might not be able to simulate the allocation rule on different
bid vectors – this is precisely the “no-simulation” constraint discussed in the Introduction. Moreover, this
issue can affect payment computation: the payment prescribed by Equation (5), although well-defined as a
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Mechanism 1: The single-parameter mechanism Mδ from [Babaioff et al., 2010]
1. Collect bid vector b.
2. Independently for each agent i ∈ [n], randomly sample χi = 1 with probability 1− δ and otherwise
χi = γ
1/(1−δ)
i , where γi ∈ [0, 1] is sampled uniformly at random.
3. Construct the vector of modified bids, x = (χ1b1, . . . , χnbn).
4. Allocate according to A˜(b) = A(x).
5. Compute payments using the formula P˜i(b) = bi · Ai(x) ·
{
1 if χi = 1
1− 1δ if χi < 1
.
mathematical expression, might not be computable given the information available to the mechanism.1
To address this issue formally, we say that the mechanism is information-feasible if for each run of of the
mechanism (i.e., for each bid vector b, each realization of the mechanism’s internal randomness, and every
possible value of the external seed) the payments are uniquely determined given the information available
to the mechanism.
Implicit payment computation for single-parameter domains. Babaioff et al. [2010] provide an implicit
payment computation result for single-parameter domains. They prove that any monotone allocation rule
for any single-parameter domain can be transformed into a truthful, information-feasible mechanism with
an arbitrarily small loss in expected welfare. The allocation rule is only invoked once. Below we quote a
special case of this result that is most relevant to the present paper.2
Theorem 2.2 (Babaioff et al. [2010]). Consider an arbitrary single-parameter domain where the private
values of each agent lie in the interval [0, 1]. Let A be a stochastically monotone allocation rule for this
domain. Then for each δ ∈ (0, 1), mechanism Mδ = (A˜, P˜) (described in Mechanism 1) is information-
feasible and has the following properties.
(a) [Incentives] Mδ is stochastically truthful, universally ex-post individually rational. If A is ex-post
monotone, then Mδ is ex-post truthful.
(b) [Performance] For n agents and any bid vector b (and any fixed external seed) allocations A˜(b) and
A(b) are identical with probability at least 1 − nδ. Moreover, if A is α-approximate (for social
welfare), then mechanism Mδ is α/(1 − δ2−δ )-approximate.
(c) [Payments] Mδ is ex-post no-positive-transfers; and although it is not universally so, for all realiza-
tions of the internal seed it never pays any agent i more than bi · Ai(x) · (1δ − 1). Mδ is universally
ex-post normalized.
1This has been proved in [Babaioff et al., 2009, Devanur and Kakade, 2009] in the context of multi-armed bandit mechanisms,
see Section 4 for more details.
2We restate the result slightly, to make it consistent with our notation. [Babaioff et al., 2010] states the mechanism more
abstractly, in terms of a general self-resampling procedure. The simple description ofMδ that we present here was first published
in [Shnayder et al., 2012].
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3 The multi-parameter transformation
In this section we present our first main contribution: the implicit payment computation result for multi-
parameter domains. For a given multi-parameter domain and a given CMON allocation rule for this domain,3
our goal is to design a truthful, information-feasible mechanism with outcome that is almost always identical
to that of the original allocation rule, and this, in particular, ensures a small loss in expected welfare. We
achieve this goal for every CMON allocation rule and every multi-parameter domain (under a mild assump-
tion of rescalable, non-negative types). More precisely, we give a general “multi-parameter transformation”
which takes an arbitrary CMON allocation rule A and transforms it into a truthful, information-feasible mech-
anism which implements the same outcome as A with probability arbitrarily close to 1. This mechanism
requires evaluating A only once; its allocation rule randomly modifies the submitted bids, and then calls
A on the modified bids.4 The technical contribution here is showing that the natural generalization of the
reduction for the single-parameter setting, to the multi-parameter setting, preserves all desired properties.
The non-trivial part of the proof is showing that although the single-parameter transformation only ensures
that each agent does not have an incentive to deviate by scaling all his bids by the same scalar in [0, 1], he
also does not have an incentive to deviate to any other arbitrary bids.
The transformation. Our multi-parameter transformation is a remarkably straightforward generalization
of the single-parameter transformation specified in Mechanism 1. In fact, there is no need to rewrite the
five steps; the only thing that changes is the interpretation of the notation. Specifically, the bids b1, . . . ,bn
should now be interpreted as elements of the type spaces T1, . . . ,Tn rather than as scalars, and for each i
the modified bid xi = χi bi is obtained by multiplying the abstract type bi (a function from outcomes to
reals) by the random scalar χi. (Note that χi bi is well-defined because we are assuming the rescalable types
property.) The notation bi · Ai(x) from the single-parameter case is now interpreted as bi(Ai(x)), where
x = (x1 , . . . ,xn) is the vector of re-sampled bids. With this interpretation, the payment rule is as follows:
P˜i(b) = bi(Ai(x)) ·
{
1 if χi = 1
1− 1δ if χi < 1
.
In the remainder of this section we analyze the properties of the multi-parameter transformation, proving
an analogue of Theorem 2.2. The subtlest step, which occupies most of the analysis, is to prove that the
modified allocation rule A˜ satisfies CMON.
Induced single-parameter domains. To aid in the analysis, it will be helpful to introduce the following
notation. Consider a bid vector b ∈ T and a vector of “rescaling coefficients” λ ∈ [0, 1]n. Denote
λ⊗ b = (λ1b1 , . . . , λnbn) ∈ T .
In other words, λ ⊗ b is the rescaled bid vector where the bid of each agent i is λibi. Note that for each b
the subset
Tb = {λ⊗ b : λ ∈ [0, 1]n} ⊂ T
forms a single-parameter type space where each agent i has private value λi ∈ [0, 1] and allocation bi(o)
for every outcome o. By abuse of notation, let us treat the allocation and payment rules for Tb as functions
from the private value space [0, 1]n rather than the type space Tb.
3Recall that CMON is a necessary and sufficient condition for truthfulness.
4The transformation presented here is certainly not the only reduction that transforms multi-parameter allocation rules satisfying
CMON into truthful, information-feasible mechanisms. One appealing feature of our transformation, in comparison to alternatives,
is its simplicity. It also optimizes the trade-off between the worst-case bid-to-payment ratio and the probability of adopting the
original allocation, as was shown by Wilkens and Sivan (2012) in the single-parameter context.
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We want to prove that the mechanism Mδ = (A˜, P˜) defined by our transformation is truthful. As a
starting observation, note that when one applies the single-parameter transformation given in Section 2 to
the allocation rule defined byAb(λ) = A(λ⊗b), one obtains a mechanism that coincides with the restriction
of Mδ to Tb. By Theorem 2.2, we may conclude that the restriction of Mδ to the single-parameter type
space Tb is truthful. Yet this conclusion is not sufficient, since this truthfulness condition is actually weaker
than what we are aiming for: it ensures that a deviation inside the single-parameter type space Tb is not
beneficial, but says nothing about deviation to other types in T \ Tb. Nevertheless, our proof will show that
if the original allocation rule was CMON, the transformed allocation rule is also CMON for the domain T , and
thus is truthful as needed.
Theorem 3.1. Consider an arbitrary multi-parameter domain (n,O,T ) with rescalable, non-negative
types. Let A be a stochastically CMON allocation rule for this domain. Let Mδ = (A˜, P˜) be the trans-
formed mechanism for some parameter δ ∈ (0, 1). Then Mδ has the following properties:
(a) [Structure] Mδ is information-feasible.
(b) [Incentives] Mδ is stochastically truthful and universally ex-post individually rational. IfA is ex-post
CMON, then M is ex-post truthful.
(c) [Performance] For n agents and any bid vector b (and any fixed external seed) allocations A˜(b) and
A(b) are identical with probability at least 1−nδ. Moreover, if A is α-approximation to the maximal
social welfare then A˜ is α/
(
1− 21−δ
)
-approximation to the maximal social welfare.
(d) [Payments] M is ex-post no-positive-transfers; and although it is not universally so, for all realiza-
tions of the internal seed it never pays any agent i more than bi(o)(1δ − 1), where o = A(b) ∈ O.
Additionally, M is universally ex-post normalized.
Proof. Mδ is information-feasible by construction, since so are the single-parameter mechanisms obtained
from Theorem 2.2. All claimed properties except truthfulness follow immediately from Theorem 2.2. Below
we prove truthfulness.
We claim that A˜ satisfies CMON. Indeed, fix bid vector b ∈ T , agent i, some k ≥ 2, and a k-tuple
xi,0, xi,1 , . . . ,xi,k ∈ Ti of this agent’s types. Let us consider a fixed realization of the random vector
χ ∈ [0, 1]n in step (2) of mechanism Mδ. For each type xi,j , note that we have
A˜(xi,j,b−i) = A (χ⊗ (xi,j, b−i)) ∈ O.
Denote this outcome by oi,j(χ). Let us apply the cycle-monotonicity of A for bid vector χ⊗ (xi,j,b−i):
EA
[∑k
j=0 xi,j(oi,j(χ)) − xi, (j−1) mod k(oi,j(χ))
]
≥ 0. (7)
Recalling that oi,j(χ) = A˜(xi,j ,b−i), we observe that for this fixed realization of χ, Equation (7) is exactly
the inequality in the definition of cycle-monotonicity for A˜. Therefore taking expectation over χ, we obtain
the desired inequality Equation (4) for A˜. Claim proved.5
It remains to prove that in the transformed mechanism (A˜, P˜), the payment rule satisfies Equation (5).
Fix bid vector b and consider the transformed single-parameter mechanism (A˜b, P˜b) for the single-parameter
5Note that the proof of cycle-monotonicity of A˜ did not use any other property of Mδ other than that the re-scaling factors χi
are chosen independently from a distribution that does not depend on A. The truthfulness of the single-parameter mechanisms
(A˜b, P˜b) is used in the forthcoming argument about payments.
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type space Tb. In the terminology of single-parameter domains, each agent i receives an allocation A˜b, i(λ) =
bi(A˜b(λ)) whenever the bid vector is λ ∈ [0, 1]n. Since this is a truthful and normalized single-parameter
mechanism, it follows that
E
[
P˜b(λ)
]
= E
[
λi A˜b, i(λ)−
∫ λi
0
A˜b, i(λ−i, t) dt
]
, ∀λ ∈ [0, 1]n.
Plugging in λ = ~1 and using the definitions of A˜b, P˜b, we obtain the desired Equation (5).
4 Multi-parameter MAB mechanisms
Let us define a natural multi-parameter extension to the MAB mechanism design problem studied in [Babaioff et al.,
2009, Devanur and Kakade, 2009, Babaioff et al., 2010].6
Problem formulation. There are n agents. For each agent there is a known and fixed set of ads he is
interested in; we assume that these sets are disjoint. The total number of ads is denoted by m.
As is common in the literature on sponsored search we assume that agents only value clicks; they have
no value for an impression when the ad is not clicked. For every ad j there is a value-per-click vj such that
the unique agent that is interested in that ad receives utility vj whenever this ad is clicked; this value is the
agent’s private information.
A mechanism for this domain proceeds as follows. There are T rounds, where the time horizon T is
fixed and known to everyone. In each round the mechanism either decides to skip this round or chooses one
ad to display. Then the ad is either clicked or not clicked. All agents bid once, before the first round. The
bid of a given agent consists of a tuple of reported values for his ads. The bid reported for ad j is denoted
bj ; the entire bid vector of all agents for the m ads is denoted b = (b1 , . . . , bm). Payments are assigned
after the last round.
For each ad j, the click probability is fixed over time and denoted µj . In each round when this ad is
displayed, it is clicked independently with probability µj . Click probabilities are called click-though rates
(CTRs) in the industry. We assume that the CTRs are not known neither to the mechanism nor to the agents.
For brevity, let µ = (µ1 , . . . , µm) be the vector of all CTRs.
Interpretation as a multi-parameter domain. For our setting, stochastic truthfulness (and similarly
stochastic CMON, etc.) is a property that holds in expectation over clicks, for all possible CTR vectors
µ.
Following the prior work, the external seed is defined as click realization ρ, in the following sense. For
every ad j and every round t, realization ρ(t, j) ∈ {0, 1} says whether this ad would be clicked if it is shown
in this round. In particular, ex-post truthfulness corresponds to truthfulness for every click realization. Note
that a given run of a mechanism does not observe the entire click realization: it only observes clicks for ads
that are displayed in a given round.
For every bid vector b and each click realization ρ, let Cj(b, ρ) be the expected total number of clicks
received by ad j, where the expectation is over the internal randomness in the mechanism. Denote C(b, ρ) =
(C1(b, ρ) , . . . , Cm(b, ρ)) and call it the click vector. We interpret the click vectors as the “outcomes”
in the multi-parameter domain. Note that a given click vector C(b, ρ) corresponds to expected welfare∑
j vjCj(b, ρ).
6Here and elsewhere, MAB stands for multi-armed bandits.
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Note that with this interpretation of the “outcomes”, the allocation rule is not free to choose any well-
defined outcome. Instead, the collection of outcomes that can be implemented on a given run of the mecha-
nism is constrained by the click realization.7
For a given CTR vector µ, let C(b, µ) = Eρ∼µC(b, ρ), where the expectation is taken over click realiza-
tions ρ according to the corresponding CTRs. Call it the µ-click vector. In expectation over the clicks, the
welfare is
∑
j vjCj(b, µ). When considering stochastic truthfulness, it will be more convenient to re-define
outcomes as µ-click vectors.
Discussion and background. If not for the issue of incentives and the requirement of truthfulness, the
welfare-maximization problem for the allocation rule is precisely the multi-armed bandit problem (hence-
forth, MAB), a well-studied problem in Machine Learning and Operations Research. MAB mechanisms
can be seen as a version of the MAB problem that incorporates incentives. MAB mechanisms (in the lim-
ited single-parameter case, with one ad per agent), were introduced and studied in [Babaioff et al., 2009,
Devanur and Kakade, 2009] for the deterministic case. Subsequently, Babaioff et al. [2010] studied ran-
domized MAB mechanisms. Below we recap some of the contributions made in [Babaioff et al., 2009,
Devanur and Kakade, 2009].
MAB mechanisms were suggested as a simple model in which one can study the interplay between
incentives and learning, two major issues that arise in pay-per-click auctions. Pay-per-click is (along with
pay-per-impression) one of the two prevalent business models in the advertising on the Internet, and the
prevalent pricing model in sponsored search. Compared to pay-per-impression, pay-per-click reduces the
risk that advertisers take, as they only pay when the ad is clicked. The seller, who has some control over
clicks, bears the risk instead. Moreover, advertisers typically have very little or no information about their
CTRs, and should not be required to learn more. The pay-per-click model essentially shields the advertisers
from this uncertainty.
The crucial assumption in our model of MAB mechanisms is that the CTRs are initially not known to
the mechanism. This assumption reflects the fact that the CTRs are learned over time, while the ads are
being allocated, and so the process of learning should be treated as a part of the game.8
The focus of the investigation in [Babaioff et al., 2009, Devanur and Kakade, 2009] was whether and
how the requirement of truthfulness restricts the performance of MAB algorithms when types are single-
parameter. They found a very severe restriction for deterministic, ex-post truthful mechanisms: the al-
location rule can only have a very simple, “naı¨ve” structure (separating exploration and exploitation),
which severely impacts performance compared to the best MAB algorithms. They capitalize on the “no-
simulation” constraint to prove that if an allocation rule does not conform to this simple structure, then a
truthful mechanism with this allocation rule cannot be information-feasible.
The obstacle of information-feasibility for the single parameter case is circumvented in Babaioff et al.
[2010] by moving from deterministic to randomized MAB mechanisms. The single-parameter transforma-
tion (Theorem 2.2) reduces the design of truthful, information-feasible MAB mechanisms to the design of
monotone allocation rules for this domain. Further, the authors provide monotone allocation rules whose
performance matches that of optimal MAB algorithms. Specifically, they show that (a minor modification
of) a standard MAB algorithm UCB1 [Auer et al., 2002] is stochastically monotone, and they design a new
MAB algorithm which is ex-post monotone and has essentially the same performance.
7Alternatively, we could have defined “outcomes” via impressions rather than clicks. But then an agent would not have a
full knowledge of his value for each outcome (his type) as the CTRs are not known to him. Such a definition necessitates some
cumbersome modifications to the framework in Section 2. Both versions lead to the same results.
8If some information on CTRs is known before the allocation starts, this can be modeled via Bayesian priors on CTRs. Follow-
ing [Babaioff et al., 2009, Devanur and Kakade, 2009, Babaioff et al., 2010], we focus on the non-Bayesian version.
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5 Multi-parameter MAB mechanisms:
Impossibility result for ex-post truthful mechanisms
In this section we present our second main contribution: a very strong impossibility result for ex-post truthful
multi-parameter MAB mechanisms. Consider one of the agents and fix the bids of the others. Essentially,
we show that an allocation rule which satisfies ex-post CMON for that agent, cannot depend on the bid of that
agent. More precisely, this holds for a deterministic allocation rule if the bids are large enough, as well as
for any allocation rule (deterministic or randomized) that never skips a round. For randomized allocation
rules that may skip a round, we show that if the allocation rule satisfies ex-post CMON then it cannot achieve
a nontrivial worst-case approximation ratio.
Theorem 5.1. Let A be an allocation rule for multi-parameter MAB which satisfies ex-post CMON. Fix any
agent i, and fix bids submitted by all other agents.
(a) If A is any allocation rule (deterministic or randomized) that never skips a round, and if agent i is the
only agent, then the allocation has no dependence on his bids.
(b) If A is deterministic, then there exists a finite B such that the allocation for agent i does not depend
on his bids, as long as all his bids are larger than B.
(c) If A is randomized, then its worst-case approximation ratio (over all bid vectors of agent i) is no
better than that of the trivial randomized allocation rule that ignores agent i’s bid, samples one of his
ads uniformly at random, and allocates all impressions to that ad.
The first conclusion presumes there is only a single agent, and to prove the remaining two conclusions
it suffices to consider the case of a single agent, because from the perspective of any given agent the ads
allocated to other agents can be represented as skips. (In particular, allowing skips in single-agent allocation
rules is essential for the generalization to multiple agents.) In the rest of this section we assume a single
agent with m ads.
To prove our result we need to set up some notation. Recall that the bids of the agent are represented
by a vector b = (b1 , . . . , bm) ∈ Rm+ . For a given allocation rule A and a given click-realization ρ, the
impression allocation A(b, t, ρ) ∈ Rm+ is a vector of probabilities, in expectation over the random seed of
the algorithm, so that Ai(b, t, ρ) is the probability that ad i is chosen in round t given bid vector b and
realization ρ.
Weak monotonicity. We use CMON through a special case where k = 2 in Equation (4); this special case
is known in the literature as weak monotonicity, henceforth abbreviated WMON. WMON is equivalent to CMON
if there are finitely many outcomes and the type space is convex [Saks and Yu, 2005]. It follows that in our
setting, ex-post WMON is equivalent to ex-post CMON for deterministic allocation rules. For more background
on WMON, see [Archer and Kleinberg, 2008a].
Let us restate WMON in the notation of multi-parameter MAB mechanisms. Recall that the click vector
C(b, ρ) is a vector such that Cj(b, ρ) is the total expected number of clicks for ad j, given bid vector b and
realization ρ. Then
Cj(b, ρ) =
∑T
t=1 ρ(t, j)Aj(b, t, ρ) =
∑T
t=1 ∆t(ρ)A(b, t, ρ),
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where ∆t(ρ) is the m × m diagonal matrix with diagonal entries (ρ(t, 1) , . . . , ρ(t,m)). Ex-post WMON
states the following: for any realization ρ and any bid vectors b, b˜ ∈ Rm+ ,
(b˜− b) · ( C(b˜, ρ)− C(b˜, ρ) ) ≥ 0
Re-writing this in terms of the impression allocation, we obtain:
(b˜− b)† ∑Tt=1 ∆t(ρ)( A(b˜, t, ρ)−A(b, t, ρ) ) ≥ 0. (8)
Here and elsewhere, M † denotes a transpose of a matrix M .
Analysis for allocation rules with no skips (Theorem 5.1(a)). For the sake of contradiction, assume that
A(b, t, ρ) 6= A(b′, t, ρ) for some round t, click-realization ρ, and bid vectors b, b′ ∈ Rm+ . Pick the smallest t
for which such counterexample exists. Assume w.l.o.g. that ρ ≡ 0 for all rounds after t. For each ad i, let ρi
be a realization that coincides with ρ on all rounds but t, and in round t ad i is clicked and all other ads are
not clicked.
Let b˜ = ~1 + max(b, b′) ∈ Rm+ , where max(b, b′) is the coordinate-wise maximum of b and b′. Since
A(b, t, ρ) 6= A(b′, t, ρ), we can w.l.o.g. assume that A(b˜, t, ρ) 6= A(b, t, ρ). Since A never skips a round,∑m
i=1Ai(b˜, t, ρ) = 1 =
∑m
i=1Ai(b, t, ρ). (9)
Combining A(b˜, t, ρ) 6= A(b, t, ρ) with Equation (9) we deduce that for some ad i, Ai(b˜, t, ρ) < Ai(b, t, ρ).
We claim that WMON is violated for bids b, b˜ and realization ρi. Indeed, consider Equation (8) for realization
ρi. The sum in Equation (8) is 0 for all rounds other than t because A(b˜, s, ρ) = A(b, s, ρ) for all rounds
s < t (by minimality of t), and ρi ≡ 0 for all rounds s > t. For round t, the sum in Equation (8) is 0 for all
ads other than i, by definition of ρi. Thus, the sum is simply equal to (bi − b˜i) · [Ai(b, t, ρ) − Ai(b˜, t, ρ)],
which is negative, contradicting Equation (8).
Analysis for the deterministic case (Theorem 5.1(b)). We now address deterministic allocation rules that
may skip rounds. The analysis of this case captures the main ideas of the randomized case while being
significantly easier to present.
Fix click-realization ρ and round t. Let A be the deterministic allocation rule for agent i that is induced
by fixing the bids of all other agents. If A skips round t, write A(b, t, ρ) = skip. For a vector b =
(b1 , . . . , bm) ∈ Rm+ , denote max(b ) = max1≤i≤m bi. Define min(b) similarly.
One technicality in the analysis is handling skips; we deal with it using the following notions:9
bmin(t, ρ) = sup{max(b) : b ∈ Rm+ and A(b, t, ρ) = skip}.
B = max ( {0} ∪ {bmin(t, ρ) : ∃ t, ρ such that bmin(t, ρ) <∞} ) . (10)
Note that B = 0 if bmin(t, ρ) =∞ for all t and ρ. For a given round t and realization ρ, bmin(t, ρ) is defined
such that if all m bids are larger than bmin(t, ρ) then the allocation does not skip at round t on realization ρ.
B is defined such that for every realization and every round, if all bids are larger than B then the allocation
rule never skips.
Claim 5.2. LetA be a deterministic single-agent allocation rule which satisfies ex-post WMON. Then for each
click-realization ρ and each round t,A does not depend on the bid vector b for all bid vectors b ∈ (B,∞)m,
where B is defined in Equation (10).
9We use a standard convention that sup(∅) = −∞.
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Proof. For the sake of contradiction, assume that A(b, t, ρ) 6= A(b′, t, ρ) for some round t, click-realization
ρ, and bid vectors b, b′ ∈ (B,∞)m. Pick the smallest t for which such counterexample exists. Assume
w.l.o.g. that ρ ≡ 0 for all rounds after t. For each ad i, let ρi be a realization such that it coincides with ρ on
all rounds but t, and in round t ad i is clicked and all other ads are not clicked.
Let us consider two cases, depending on whether bmin(t, ρ) is finite.
Case 1: bmin(t, ρ) = ∞. At least one of A(b, t, ρ), A(b′, t, ρ) is not equal to skip. Since A(b, t, ρ) 6=
A(b′, t, ρ), we can w.l.o.g. assume that A(b, t, ρ) 6= skip. Hence, Ai(b, t, ρ) = 1 for some ad i. Since
bmin(t, ρ) =∞, there exists b˜ ∈ (max(b ), ∞)m such that A(b˜, t, ρ) = skip.
We claim WMON is violated for bids b, b˜ and realization ρi. As in the first case, we see that the sum
in Equation (8) is 0 for all rounds other than t, and for round t the sum is 0 for all ads other than i. Again, it
follows that the sum is simply equal to bi− b˜i, which is negative, contradicting Equation (8). Claim proved.
Case 2: bmin(t, ρ) <∞. The proof of this case is very similar to the proof of Theorem 5.1(b).
Recall that in case 1 it holds that bmin(t, ρ) < ∞. Let b˜ = ~1 + max(b, b′) ∈ Rm+ , where max(b, b′) is
the coordinate-wise maximum of b and b′. Since bmin(t, ρ) < ∞, it follows that B ≥ bmin(t, ρ), so neither
A(b, t, ρ) nor A(b′, t, ρ) nor A(b˜, t, ρ) is equal to skip. Since A(b, t, ρ) 6= A(b′, t, ρ), we can w.l.o.g.
assume that A(b˜, t, ρ) 6= A(b, t, ρ). In particular, Ai(b˜, t, ρ) = 0 and Ai(b, t, ρ) = 1 for some ad i.
We claim that WMON is violated for bids b, b˜ and realization ρi. Indeed, consider Equation (8) for real-
ization ρi. The sum in Equation (8) is 0 for all rounds other than t because A(b˜, s, ρ) = A(b, s, ρ) for all
rounds s < t (by minimality of t), and ρi ≡ 0 for all rounds s > t. For round t, the sum in Equation (8)
is 0 for all ads other than i, by definition of ρi. Thus, the sum is simply equal to bi − b˜i, which is negative,
contradicting Equation (8). Claim proved.
5.1 Analysis of the randomized case: proof of Theorem 5.1(c)
The proof of the randomized case of Theorem 5.1 is technically more involved than the proof of Theo-
rem 5.1(b)). In particular, even stating the analog of Claim 5.2 requires a considerable amount of setup.
Define functions f, g,G : N×R+ → R+ by the following recurrence: f(0, y) = g(0, y) = G(0, y) = 0
for all y; while for t > 0:
f(t, y) = 3ymG(t− 1, y) + 1
g(t, y) = 2 f(t, y) + 2 + 3ymG(t− 1, y)
G(t, y) = g(t, y) +G(t− 1, y) =∑ts=1 g(s, y).
For real numbers B ≥ 0, y ≥ 1, let D(B, y) denote the set
D(B, y) = {b : min(b ) ≥ B,max(b)/min(b) ≤ y}.
We will refer to a bid vector as “y-balanced” if it satisfies max(b)/min(b) ≤ y.
LetA be a (potentially randomized) allocation rule. Fix realization ρ. For all times t and all ǫ > 0, y ≥ 1
let
Amax(t, ρ, y) = lim sup
x→∞
{ ‖A(b, t, ρ)‖1 : b ∈ D(x, y) }
bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) = sup {x : ∃b ∈ D(x, y) ‖A(b, t, ρ)‖1 < Amax(t, ρ, y) − ǫ f(t, y) }
Bǫ(y) =
{
0 if bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) =∞ for all t, ρ, ǫ
sup (R ∩ {bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) : t ∈ N, ǫ > 0}) otherwise.
14
Here Amax(t, ρ, y) is the maximal expected number of impressions at time t such that the agent can obtain
this number with arbitrarily large y-balanced bids. The meaning of bmax is as follows: if every component
of a y-balanced vector b is above bmax, the expected number of impressions for time t is guaranteed to be
within ǫ f(t, y) of the best possible. Note that Bǫ(y) = 0 if bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) is infinite for all t and all ρ.
Claim 5.3. Let A be a single-agent allocation rule which satisfies ex-post WMON. Then for any y ≥ 1, any
ǫ > 0, any bid vectors b, b′ ∈ D(Bǫ(y), y), any realization ρ, and any round t, we have∥∥A(b, t, ρ)−A(b′, t, ρ)∥∥
1
≤ ǫ g(t, y)
Proof. Fix ǫ > 0 and realization ρ. Let us use induction on t. Case t = 0 is trivial, interpreting A(b, 0, ρ) =
~0 for all ρ, b. Now assume the claim is true for all times s < t. For the sake of contradiction, assume the
claim does not hold for time t and some realization ρ.
By definition of Amax, there exists a number M∗ such that
sup
b∈D(M∗,y)
‖A(b, t, ρ)‖1 < Amax(t, ρ, y) + ǫ.
For each ad i, define a new realization ρi as follows: it coincides with ρ before time t, only i gets clicked at
time t, and there are no clicks after t.
Fix bid vectors b, b′ ∈ D(Bǫ(y), y). Pick some bid vector b˜ ∈ D(M˜, y), where
M˜ = max(M∗, 3y
∥∥b+ b′∥∥∞).
Let M = max(b˜).
WMON for realization ρi, applied to bid vectors b and b˜, states the following:
(b˜− b )† ∆t(ρi)
(
A(b˜, t, ρ)−A(b, t, ρ)
)
(11)
+ (b˜− b )†
t−1∑
s=1
∆s(ρ)
(
A(b˜, s, ρ)−A(b, s, ρ)
)
≥ 0. (12)
The first summand in Equation (11) is simply (b˜i − bi)
(
Ai(b˜, t, ρ)−Ai(b, t, ρ)
)
.
By the induction hypothesis, for each time s < t it holds that
(b˜− b )† ∆s(ρ)
(
A(b˜, s, ρ)−A(b, s, ρ)
)
≤M ǫg(s, y)
It follows that
(b˜− b )†
t−1∑
s=1
∆s(ρ)
(
A(b˜, s, ρ)−A(b, s, ρ)
)
≤M ǫ
t−1∑
s=1
g(s, y) = M ǫG(t− 1, y)
Plugging this into Equation (11), we obtain
(b˜i − bi)
(
Ai(b˜, t, ρ)−Ai(b, t, ρ)
)
≥ −M ǫG(t− 1, y)
Ai(b˜, t, ρ)−Ai(b, t, ρ) ≥ −(b˜i − bi)−1M ǫG(t− 1, y).
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We have b˜i ≥M/y since b˜ is y-balanced. Also bi ≤M/(3y) by our choice of M . Therefore b˜i − bi ≥ 2M3y
and
Ai(b˜, t, ρ)−Ai(b, t, ρ) ≥ −3y2 ǫG(t− 1, y). (13)
Case 1: bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) < ∞. Denote Xi = Ai(b, t, ρ) and X ′i = Ai(b′, t, ρ). Let min(Xi,X ′i) be the
coordinate-wise minimum of Xi and X ′i; define max(Xi,X ′i) similarly.
In this notation, our goal is to bound ‖X −X ′‖1 above by ǫ g(t, y). Assume b˜ = M~1 for someM ≥ M˜ .
By Equation (13), noting that this argument applies to both b and b′, we have:
Ai(b˜, t, ρ) ≥ max(Xi,X ′i)− 3y2 ǫG(t− 1, y).
Summing this over all ads:∥∥∥A(b˜, t, ρ)∥∥∥
1
≥
∥∥max(X,X ′)∥∥
1
− 3y2 ǫmG(t− 1, y).
Recall that
∥∥∥A(b˜, t, ρ)∥∥∥
1
≤ Amax(t, ρ, y) + ǫ by our choice of M . Therefore:∥∥max(X,X ′)∥∥
1
≤ Amax(t, ρ, y) + ǫ (1 + 3y2 mG(t− 1, y)).
Note that
‖X‖1 +
∥∥X ′∥∥
1
=
∥∥max(X,X ′)∥∥
1
+
∥∥min(X,X ′)∥∥
1∥∥X −X ′∥∥
1
=
∥∥max(X,X ′)∥∥
1
− ∥∥min(X,X ′)∥∥
1
‖X‖1 +
∥∥X ′∥∥
1
+
∥∥X −X ′∥∥
1
= 2
∥∥max(X,X ′)∥∥
1
Because bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) < ∞ and b, b′ ∈ D(Bǫ(y), y), both ‖X‖1 and ‖X ′‖1 are at least Amax(t, ρ, y) −
ǫ f(t, y). Therefore:
2Amax(t, ρ)− 2ǫ f(t, y) +
∥∥X −X ′∥∥
1
≤ 2 ∥∥max(X,X ′)∥∥
1
≤ 2Amax(t, ρ, y) + 2 ǫ (1 + 3y2 G(t− 1, y)).
It follows that ∥∥X −X ′∥∥
1
≤ 2ǫ
(
1 + f(t, y) + 3y2 mG(t− 1, y)
)
= ǫ g(t, y).
Thus, we have proved the induction step assuming bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) is finite.
Case 2: bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) =∞. This case is impossible: we will arrive at a contradiction.
By definition of Amax, there exists a bid vector b ∈ D(Bǫ(y), y) such that
‖A(b, t, ρ)‖1 > Amax(t, ρ, y) − 12 ǫ f(t, y).
Since bmax(t, ρ, ǫ, y) =∞, we can pick b˜ ∈ D(M˜, y) such that∥∥∥A(b˜, t, ρ)∥∥∥
1
≤ Amax(t, ρ, y)− ǫ f(t, y) ≤ ‖A(b, t, ρ)‖1 − 12 ǫ f(t, y).
It follows that
m∑
i=1
[
Ai(b, t, ρ)−Ai(b˜, t, ρ)
]
≥ 12 ǫ f(t, y)
∃i Ai(b, t, ρ)−Ai(b˜, t, ρ) ≥ 12m ǫ f(t, y).
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Using Equation (13), for this i we have:
1
2m ǫ f(t, y) ≤ Ai(b, t, ρ) −Ai(b˜, t, ρ) ≤ 3y2 ǫG(t− 1, y).
Thus, f(t, y) ≤ 3ymG(t− 1, y), contradicting the definition of f .
Using Claim 5.3, it is now easy to prove Theorem 5.1(c).
of Theorem 5.1(c). For any δ > 0, let
y = 2m/δ
ǫ = δ2mg(T,y)
B = Bǫ(y).
In our proof we will considering applying A to the bid vector b0 = B~1 as well as the vectors bj defined for
j = 1, . . . ,m by changing the jth of b0 from B to yB. The vectors b0, . . . , bm all belong to D(B, y).
Let ρ be a realization such that ρ(t, j) = 1 for all t, j, i.e. every ad is always clicked. Since A can
never allocate more than T impressions, we have
∑T
t=1
∑m
i=1Ai(b0, t, ρ) ≤ T . Hence, there is at least one
j ∈ [m] such that
T∑
t=1
Aj(b0, t, ρ) ≤ T/m. (14)
Now, for every round t, we have
Aj(bj , t, ρ)−Aj(b0, t, ρ) ≤
∥∥A(bj, t, ρ)−A(b0, t, ρ)∥∥
1
≤ ǫ g(t, y) = δ2m , (15)
where the second inequality follows from Claim 5.3. Summing Equation (15) over t = 1, . . . , T and
combining with Equation (14), we deduce that
T∑
t=1
Aj(bj , t, ρ) ≤
(
1 δ2
)
T
m .
The optimal allocation for bid vector bj assigns every impression to ad j, achieving a total value of yBT . In-
stead, the allocation computed by A achieves a total value bounded above by (1 + δ2) yBTm +BT , where the
first term accounts for impressions allocated to ad j and the second term accounts for all other impressions.
We have (
1 + δ2
) yBT
m +BT =
yBT
m ·
(
1 + δ2 +
m
y
)
= yBT · 1+δm .
Since δ > 0 was an arbitrarily small positive constant, we conclude that the worst-case approximation ratio
of A is no better than 1/m, which is trivially achieved by a random allocation.
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6 Multi-parameter MAB mechanisms: A stochastic CMON allocation rule
In this section we consider the problem of designing stochastically truthful multi-parameter MAB mech-
anisms. As discussed in the introduction, the VCG mechanism cannot be used as it is informationally-
infeasible. Additionally, pricing based mechanisms do not seem to be feasible. The only other technique
that is extensively exploited in the literature for multi-parameter domains is using maximal in distributional
range (MIDR) allocation rules. We formalize the limitations of a natural family of MIDR allocation rules (in
which the set of distributions the rule optimizes over is independent of the CTRs) in Section 6.3, showing
that the performance of such rules is no better than randomly selecting an ad to present. We next discuss
some simple approaches to create truthful mechanisms: the first disregards the bids, and the second uses
randomization to reduce the problem to a single parameter problem.
The first approach is bid-independent allocation rules – ones that do not depend on the bids. Among
those, we naturally focus on the allocation rule that achieves the best worst-case performance, that rule
samples an ad independently and uniformly at random in each round; call it RND.
A slightly more sophisticated approach randomly reduces the problem to a single parameter problem as
follows. One ad is selected independently for each agent, uniformly at random from this agent’s ads. Then
some truthful single-parameter mechanism M is run on the selected ads. Call this mechanism SubSample.
This mechanism is truthful (ex-post or stochastically, same as M) because for each realization of the selec-
tion described above, it is simply a truthful single-parameter mechanism. The performance of this mecha-
nism is the same as the performance of the trivial RND mechanism when there is only one agent.
These two naı¨ve approaches have poor performance. For example, for a single agent none performs
better than uniformly randomizing over the ads. We call such a performance trivial. This gives rise to the
following major open problem.
Open Problem: Design a stochastically truthful mechanism for the multi-parameter MAB problem that
achieves optimal approximation.
A more modest goal is to design a stochastically truthful mechanism for the multi-parameter MAB prob-
lem that achieves non-trivial performance, even for some “well-behaved” subset of inputs. Unfortunately,
it seems that all standard tools fail to achieve even this modest goal. Below we achieve this by designing
a stochastically CMON allocation rule and then applying the multi-parameter transformation from Section 3.
We interpret this result as an evidence that it is not completely hopeless to significantly improve over the
trivial approaches.
6.1 The stochastically CMON allocation rule
We design a stochastically CMON allocation rule ALL whose expected welfare exceeds that of RND on all prob-
lem instances with at least two agents, and that of SubSample on an important family of problem instances
which we characterize below. Structurally ALL depends on all submitted bids, is provably not MIDR, and,
unlike SubSample, does not proceed through an explicit reduction to a single-parameter allocation rule. Im-
plementing ALL as a truthful, information-feasible mechanism requires the full power of our multi-parameter
transformation.
All results in this section require all private values to be bounded from above by 1. We will assume that
without further notice.
Recap of notation. The term “expected welfare” refers to expectation over the randomness in the allocation
rule and the clicks (for a given vector of CTRs). Let W (RND) denote the expected welfare of RND. Let
A0 = {1 , . . . ,m} be the set of m ads of all agents. Recall that vj , bj and µj be, resp., denote the private
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value, the submitted bid, and the CTR for ad j. Note that the expected value from each time a given ad j is
displayed is vjµj .
Allocation rule ALL for ≥ 2 agents. Assume there are at least two agents. Define the following allocation
rule, call it ALL. It consists of two phases: exploration and exploitation. Exploration lasts for T0 rounds,
where T0 ≥ 1 is fixed and chosen in advance. In each exploration round an ad is chosen uniformly at random
among all ads. Let nj be the number of clicks for ad j by the end of the exploration phase. In each round of
exploitation ALL does the following:
(L1) pick each ad j with probability bj nj/T0, where bj is the bid for ad j.
(L2) with the remaining probability pick an ad uniformly at random.
This completes the specification of ALL. We note that even a single round of exploration suffices for our
purposes. Using a small T0 does not affect the expected performance, but results in a (very) high variance.
Discussion. We design ALL to ensure that the allocation probabilities depend on CTRs and bids in a simple,
linear way. Below we explain why this “linear dependence” property is useful, and discuss some of the
challenges in the analysis of ALL.
Let the allocation-vector be a vector a ∈ ℜm whose j-th component is the expected number of times ad
j is allocated by ALL. For a given vector of CTRs, the allocation-range is the set of all allocation-vectors
that can be realized by ALL. We conjecture that the allocation-range needs to depend on CTRs in order for
an allocation rule to satisfy stochastic CMON and be, in some sense, non-trivial. (In Section 6.3, we prove a
version of this conjecture that is restricted to stochastically MIDR allocation rules.) The “linear dependence”
property of ALL ensures that the allocation-range does depend on CTRs.
For example, consider an allocation rule which has an exploration phase of fixed duration, picks the
best (estimated) ad based on the clicks received so far, and sticks with this ad from then on. This allocation
rule that is ex-post truthful in the single-parameter setting, and is perhaps the most natural candidate for a
reasonable, easy-to-analyze allocation rule for our setting. However, the allocation-range of this allocation
rule does not depend on CTRs (because the set of possible options for exploitation is fixed: any one ad can
be chosen).
Further, the proof technique that we use in the analysis of ALL essentially requires us, for every given
agent, to solve a system of equations where the unknowns are this agent’s bids and the parameters are the
CTRs and the components of the allocation vector. The allocation probabilities in ALL are explicitly defined
in terms of bids in order to enable us to solve this system of equations in a desirable way; this is another
place where the “linear dependence” property of ALL is helpful.
The subtle point in our analysis of ALL – or, it seems, in any analysis using the same proof technique –
is that one needs to ensure that the allocation vector is a maximizer of a certain expression, which requires
us to prove the positive-definiteness of the corresponding Hessian matrix. The “linear dependence” property
of ALL enables us to argue about the Hessian matrix in a useful way.
As we discovered, the positive-definiteness of the Hessian should not be taken for granted: indeed, it
fails for a number of otherwise promising allocation rules with better performance. We believe that further
progress on stochastically CMON allocation rules would require a more systematic understanding of how
changes in the allocation rule propagate through the analysis and affect the Hessian matrix.
Guarantees for ALL for ≥ 2 agents. A problem instance is called uniform if the product vjµj is the same
for all j, and non-uniform otherwise. Note that for uniform problem instances RND is optimal, and in fact all
allocation rules without skips have the same expected welfare, and are all optimal. We will assume that all
values-per-click are at most 1, and that all CTRs are strictly positive.
Note that instances on which RND performs very poorly are those where for one ad j the product vjµj is
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large while for all other ads this product is very low. On the other hand, for such inputs ALL plays the best
ad significantly more often.
We next present a parameter that aims to quantify the divergence of the instance from uniform and will
be used to measure the performance of ALL. A problem instance is called σ-skewed, for some σ ∈ [1,m], if
it satisfies
(M2)
2 ≥ σ(M1)2, where Mq =
(
1
m
∑m
j=1 (vj µj)
q
)1/q
. (16)
Note that problem instances can be σ-skewed for any given σ ∈ [1,m]. It is 1-skewed for uniform problem
instances, and m-skewed when only one ad is good while all other ads have value 0.
Let W0(ALL) be the expected per-round welfare for the exploitation phase of ALL, and let W0(RND) be
the expected per-round welfare for RND. Note that W0(RND) = M1. The properties of ALL with at least
two agents are captured by the next lemma (which is the main technical lemma in this section); its proof is
deferred to Appendix 6.2.
Lemma 6.1. With at least two agents, allocation rule ALL satisfies the following:
(a) If the CTRs for all ads are strictly positive then ALL satisfies stochastic CMON.
(b) For W0(ALL) and W0(RND) as defined above it holds that
W0(ALL)−W0(RND) = M22 −M21 , where Mq =
(
1
m
∑m
j=1 (bj µj)
q
)1/q
.
In particular, W (ALL) > W (RND) for all non-uniform problem instances.
The allocation rule ALL does not have the property that scaling all bids by a common factor scales the
expected welfare by the same factor; therefore it is not MIDR (see Section 6.3 for the definition of MIDR, as
it applies to our setting).
Reduction to the single-agent case. For a single agent, we define our allocation rule ALL as follows: we
simulate a run of ALL with a single round of exploration and two agents, where the second agent is a dummy
agent with a single ad. The dummy agent submits a bid of zero for his ad, and we fix its CTR to 12 (any CTR
works). This completes the specification of ALL.
Denote the resulting two-agent allocation rule by ALL∗. The single-agent allocation rule satisfies CMON
because so does ALL∗. Since the dummy agent does not contribute welfare (because of the zero bid), we
have W0(ALL) = W0(ALL∗). Applying Lemma 6.1(a) to ALL∗, we see that
W0(ALL) = M
∗
1 + (M
∗
2 )
2 − (M∗1 )2, where M∗q =
(
1
m+1
∑m
j=1 (bj µj)
q
)1/q
. (17)
We summarize the useful properties of ALL in the following lemma:
Lemma 6.2. Consider the case of a single agent; assume µj > 0 for all ads j. Then ALL satisfies stochastic
CMON, and its welfare in exploitation rounds satisfies Equation (17). In the one exploration round, ALL
obtains welfare mm+1W0(RND).
Main provable guarantee. Let Mδ be the mechanism obtained by applying Theorem 3.1 to ALL with
parameter δ ∈ (0, 1). The main result of this section follows.
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Theorem 6.3. Consider a multi-parameter MAB domain with vj ≤ 1 and µj > 0 for every ad j. Then
mechanism Mδ is stochastically truthful, for every δ ∈ (0, 1).
Consider σ-skewed problem instances, and assume maxj∈A0 vjµj > ǫ > 0. There exists δ ∈ (0, 1) such
that mechanism Mδ satisfies the following:
(a) W (M) > W (RND) on all problem instances with at least two agents, as long as σ > 1.
(b) W (M) > W (RND) = W (SubSample) on all problem instances with a single agent with m ads, as
long as σ > 1 + m+1mǫ +
m+1
ǫ(T−1) .
(c) Suppose there exists an agent with k > m/2 ads; w.l.o.g. assume this is agent 1. Then W (M) >
W (SubSample) on all problem instances such that σ > 1 + m(m−k)kǫ when for all agents i > 1 all
private values are 0.10 11
The theorem follows from Lemma 6.1, Lemma 6.2 and Theorem 3.1 via straightforward computations,
some of which we omit from this version. Recall that for each δ > 0 we have W (Mδ) > (1− δ)W (ALL).
Theorem 6.3(a). Assume M2 > (1+ǫ)M1 and maxj∈A0 bjµj > ǫ for some ǫ > 0. Then, using the notation
of Lemma 6.1(b), we have M1 ≥ ǫ/m, and therefore
W0(ALL)−W0(RND) ≥M21 ((1 + ǫ)2 − 1) > M1 2ǫ
2
m .
Recall that T0 is the duration of exploration in ALL, and T is the time horizon. Then:
W (RND) = T W0(RND) = T M1
W (ALL) = T0W0(RND) + (T − T0)W0(ALL)
= W (RND) + (T − T0) (W0(ALL)−W0(RND))
> W (RND) + γ W (RND), where γ = 2ǫ
2(T−T0)
mT
W (M) > (1− η)W (ALL) > (1− η)(1 + γ)W (RND).
Thus, to ensure that W (M) > W (RND), it suffices to take η < 1− 11+γ .
Proof Sketch of Theorem 6.3(bc). For part (b), recall that W0(RND) = W0(SubSample) = 1m
∑m
j=1 bj µj .
With a simple computation which we omit from this version, one derives that W (A) > W (RND). We prove
W (M) > W (RND) using a computation similar to the one in the proof of part (a), we omit the details.
For part (c), note thatW0(RND) = M1 and (under the assumptions in Theorem 6.3(c)), W (SubSample) ≤
1
kM1. Again, using a simple computation one can show that W (A) > W (SubSample), and then pick a
sufficiently small δ as in the proof of part (a).
10One can also derive a version of this result where the private values for all agents i > 1 are smaller than δ, for some δ ≪ ǫ.
We omit the easy details.
11Note that the instances considered in this result are generalizing the instances we have discussed before. There are instances in
which one agent have all but one ad, and only one of his ads has positive value, while all the rest of the ads (his and others) have
value 0.
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6.2 Proof of the main technical lemma (Lemma 6.1)
Let us set up some notation. Consider an exploitation round in the execution of ALL. For each ad j, let Ej
be the event that ad j is chosen in line (L1) of the algorithm’s specification. Let Eu be the remaining event
in line (L2) when the ad is chosen uniformly at random. Denote xj = Pr[Ej ], and note that for each ad j,
xj , Pr[Ej ] = bj E[nj]/T0 =
1
m bjµj.
of Lemma 6.1(b). Consider a round in the exploitation phase of ALL. Partition this round into events P =
{E1 , . . . , Em;Eu}. For each event E ∈ P in this partition, let W0(E) be the expected per-round welfare
of ALL from this event, so that W0(ALL) =
∑
E∈PW0(E). Note that W0(Eu) = Pr[Eu]W0(RND). Further,
W0(Ej) = bjµj Pr[Ej ] = mx
2
j for each ad i.
It is easy to see that W0(RND) = 1m
∑
j bjµj =
∑
j xj . It follows that
W0(ALL)−W0(RND) =
∑
E∈PW0(E) − Pr[E]W0(RND)
=
∑
j W0(Ej)−
∑
j Pr[Ej ]W0(RND)
=
(
m
∑
j x
2
j
)
−
(∑
j xj
)2
= M22 −M21 .
For Lemma 6.1(a), we rely on the following characterization of CMON from prior work:
Lemma 6.4. Consider a function f : S → ℜk, where S ⊂ ℜk. Let f(S) ⊂ ℜk be the image of f . Then f
is CMON if and only if it is an affine maximizer, i.e.
f(x) = argmax
y∈f(S)
[x · y − g(y)] for some function g : f(S)→ ℜ.
Proof of Lemma 6.1(a). Assume that there are at least two agents, and all CTRs are strictly positive. Without
loss of generality, let us focus on agent 1. We will use the following notation. Let A = {1 , . . . , k} be the
set of ads submitted by agent 1. Here k is the number of ads submitted by agent 1; note that k < m. Let
b = (b1 , . . . , bk) be the vector of bids for agent 1, where bj is the bid on ad j. Let B = [0, 1]k be the set of
all possible bid vectors for agent 1. Let µ = (µ1 , . . . , µk) be the vector of CTRs for agent 1. We will use
both i and j to index ads.
Throughout the proof, let us keep the bids of all other agents fixed. Let Ci,t(b) be the expected number
of clicks that ad i receives in round t of ALL, given the bid vector b, where the expectation is taken over all
realizations of the clicks and over the randomness in the algorithm.12
Let ~Ct(b) = (C1,t(b) , . . . , Ck,t(b)) be the round-t vector over the ads of agent 1, and let ~C(b) =∑
t
~Ci,t(b) be the vector whose i-th component is the total expected number of clicks for ad i.
We need to prove that the function ~C : B → ℜk satisfies CMON. It suffices to prove that CMON is satisfied
for each round t separately, i.e. that it is satisfied for each function ~Ct. This is obvious if t is an exploration
round. In the rest of the proof we fix t to be an exploitation round.
By Lemma 6.4, it suffices to prove that ~Ct(b) is an affine maximizer, i.e. that
~Ct(b) = argmax
p∈ ~Ct(B)
∑
j∈A
bi pi −G(p, µ) (18)
12Here it is more convenient to use a slightly different notation for click-vectors, compared to Section 4.
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for some function G(p, µ) : ~Ct(B)× [0, 1]k → ℜ, where ~Ct(B) ⊂ [0, 1]k is the image of ~Ct. Crucially, the
function G cannot depend on b. 13
Denote p∗ = ~Ct(b). If p∗ is an interior point of ~Ct(B) and function G is differentiable, then Equa-
tion (18) implies the following:
∂
∂pi
G(p∗, µ) = bi for each ad i, bid vector b and CTR vector µ. (19)
We will construct a function G(p, µ) so that it satisfies Equation (19).
Here and on, i ∈ A denotes an arbitrary ad of agent 1. Recall that xi = Pr[Ei] = 1mbiµi. Thus:
Pr[Eu] = 1−
∑
j∈A0 Pr[Ej] = 1−
∑
j∈A0 xj
Ci,t(b) = µi
(
Pr[Ei] +
1
m Pr[Eu]
)
= µi
(
xi +
1
m − 1m
∑
j∈A0 xj
)
.
Recalling the notation p∗ = ~Ct(b) and solving for xi, we obtain
p∗i /µi = xi +
1
m − 1m
∑
j∈A0 xj∑
j∈A p
∗
j/µj =
∑
j∈A xj +
k
m − km
∑
j∈A0 xj
= ( km − Y ) + (1− km )
∑
j∈A0 xj , where Y =
∑
j∈A0\A xj.
p∗i /µi = xi − α
∑
j∈A p
∗
j/µj + β.
where α = 1m−k and β =
1
m − α(Y − km). It follows that
bi =
m
µi
xi = p
∗
i
m
µ2i
+
∑
j∈A
p∗j
αm
µiµj
− βm
µi
. (20)
Denote the RHS of Equation (20) by fi(p∗, µ). We have proved that bi = fi(p∗, µ) for each ad i. Thus to
obtain Equation (19) it suffices to pick G(p, µ) so that it satisfies
∂
∂pi
G(p, µ) = fi(p, µ) for each i ∈ A. (21)
Integrating fi(p∗, µ) over pi, for each ad i, and combining the resulting expressions, we obtain
G(p, µ) = −
∑
i∈A
pi
mβ
µi
+
m
2
∑
i∈A
p2i
1 + α
µ2i
+
∑
j∈A\{i}
pipj
mα
µiµj
. (22)
It is easy to check that this G satisfies Equation (21), which in turn implies Equation (19). 14 It follows
that for this G, p = p∗ is a critical point in Equation (18). From here on we will use the G as defined
in Equation (22).
We claim that the critical point p = p∗ is in fact a local maximum in Equation (18). Equivalently, we
claim that p = p∗ is a local minimum of the function
λ(p) = G(p, µ)− p · b : ℜk → ℜ.
13Note that G can depend on the CTRs, even though the mechanism does not know them. This is because G is only used for the
analysis – to prove CMON, and it is not actually used in the mechanism.
14Write fi(p, µ) = φi +
∑
j∈A pj γij for some numbers φi and γij . Then a function G(p, µ) satisfying Equation (21) exists if
and only if γij = γji for all i 6= j.
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For that, it suffices to prove that the Hessian matrix H of λ(·), defined by
Hij =
∂
∂pi ∂pj
λ(p) =
∂
∂pi ∂pj
G(p, µ),
is positive-definite for p = p∗ . Note that for any p ∈ ℜk it holds that
Hij =
{
τρ2i , i = j,
ρiρj , i 6= j,
(23)
where ρi =
√
αm
µi
for each i ∈ A, and τ = 1+αα = 1 + m − k ≥ 2. By Claim 6.5, such matrix is
positive-definite.
To complete the proof, we will show that p = p∗ is the global maximum in Equation (18) over all
p ∈ ℜk. For that, it suffices to prove that that p = p∗ is the unique critical point over the entire ℜk, i.e. the
unique solution for the system
∂
∂pi
G(p, µ) = bi for each ad i ∈ A. (24)
Let us re-write this system using Equation (21). (We find it convenient to use the notation τ and ρi, as
in Equation (23).) Namely, for each i ∈ A we have:
bi +
βm
µi
= fi(p, µ) +
βm
µi
= pi
(
τρ2i
)
+
∑
j∈A\{i} pj (ρiρj) .
It follows that the system in Equation (24) is equivalent to
H · p = w,
where the k × k matrix H is defined by Equation (23), and the vector w ∈ ℜk is defined by wi = bi + βmµi
for all i. The matrix H is non-singular (since it is positive-definite), so the system H · p = w has a unique
solution p.
Claim 6.5. Consider a k × k matrix H given by Equation (23), where ρ1 , . . . , ρk are arbitrary positive
numbers. Assume τ ≥ 1. Then H is positive definite.
Proof. We will use the Gram matrix characterization of positive-definite matrices. Namely, to prove that H
is positive-definite, it suffices to construct finite-dimensional vectors w1 , . . . , wk such that Hij = wi · wj
for all i, j and the vectors are linearly independent. Consider vectors w1 , . . . , wk ∈ ℜk+1 defined as
follows:
wi(ℓ) =

√
τ − 1 ρi, ℓ = i, ℓ ≤ k
0, ℓ 6= i, ℓ ≤ k
ρi, ℓ = k + 1,
It is easy to see that these vectors satisfy the desired properties.
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6.3 An impossibility result for stochastically MIDR allocation rules
Let us consider stochastically MIDR allocation rules for multi-parameter MAB mechanisms. We show that
any such allocation rule (with a significant but reasonable restriction) is essentially trivial.
Let us formulate what it means for a given allocation rule A to be stochastically MIDR in our setting, in
a specific way that is convenient for us to work with. For a given bid vector b ∈ (0,∞)m, and CTR vector
µ ∈ [0, 1]m, let the allocation-vector be a vector a = (a1 , . . . , am) such that aj is the expected number of
times ad j ∈ [m] is allocated byA. Note that the expected welfare corresponding to a given allocation vector
a is simply
∑
j ajbjµj . Let F0 = {a ∈ [0, T ]m :
∑
j aj ≤ T} be the set of all feasible allocation-vectors.
(The sum of the entries can be less than T because skips are allowed.) Then A is stochastically MIDR if and
only if for all bid vectors b and all CTR vectors µ it holds that
W (A(b)) = max
a∈F
∑
j ajbjµj (25)
for some F ⊂ F0 that does not depend on b, but can depend on µ.
Note that Equation (25) does not immediately provide a stochastically truthful mechanism via VCG
payments, because the computation of VCG payments is not immediately feasible without knowing the
CTRs. In fact, Equation (25) does not even provide an immediate way to compute the allocation (assuming
|F| ≥ 2), again because of the issue of not knowing the CTRs. This is in stark contrast with the prior
work on MIDR (which studied settings without the ”no-simulation” constraint) where the MIDR property
immediately gave rise to a truthful mechanism via the VCG payment rule.
However, if an allocation rule satisfies Equation (25) then a truthful mechanism can be obtained, with
an arbitrarily small loss in welfare, via the transformation in Wilkens and Sivan [2012].
We consider a restricted version of Equation (25) where the range F cannot depend on the CTRs (we
will call such range F CTR-independent). We prove that any such allocation rule is welfare-equivalent to a
time-invariant allocation rule. Here an allocation rule is called time-invariant if in each round, it picks an
ad independently from the same distribution over ads (this distribution may depend on the bids). Note that
time-invariant allocation rules ignore the feedback that they receive (i.e., the clicks), and thus cannot adjust
to the CTRs.
Lemma 6.6. Consider a multi-parameter MAB domain. Let A be a stochastically MIDR allocation rule
with CTR-invariant range. For each bid vector b there exists an allocation-vector a = a(b) ∈ F0 such that
W (A(b)) = ∑j ajbjµj for all CTR vectors µ. So A is welfare-equivalent to a time-invariant allocation
rule (where, letting T be the time horizon, each ad j is chosen with probability aj(b)/T ). The approximation
ratio of A (compared to the welfare of the best ad) is at least m on some problem instances.
Proof. Let us fix the bid vector b and consider both sides of Equation (25) as functions of µ. First, we note
that the expected welfare W (A(b)) is a finite-degree polynomial in variables µ1 , . . . , µm. 15 This is
because, letting Aj(b, ρ, t) be the probability that ad j is displayed at round j given click-realization ρ, it
holds that
W (A(b)) = ∑ρ Pr[ρ] ∑j,t ρ(t, j)Aj(b, ρ, t). (26)
Here the outer sum is over all click-realizations ρ, and the inner sum is over all rounds t and all ads j. Pr[ρ]
is the probability that ρ is realized for the given CTR vector. Equation (26) is a polynomial in the CTRs
15Namely, the degree is at most T , the time horizon.
25
because for each click-realization ρ, the inner sum is a fixed number, and Pr[ρ] is a polynomial in the CTRs
of degree T .
Let us re-write Equation (25) as follows:
W (A(b)) = max
β∈Fb
β · µ, where Fb = {β ∈ ℜm : βj = ajbj for each j, a ∈ F}. (27)
Since Fb is fixed, the right-hand side of Equation (27) is uniquely determined by µ, denote it W (µ).
Note that for each β ∈ Fb, it holds that
W (µ) = β · µ if and only if (β − β′) · µ ≥ 0 for all β′ ∈ Fb.
For each β ∈ ℜk, consider the half-space Hβ = {µ ∈ [0, 1]m : β · µ ≥ 0}. Then
W (µ) = β · µ if and only if µ ∈ Sβ, where Sβ =
⋂
β′∈Fb
Hβ−β′ .
Note that Sβ is a convex set, as an intersection of convex sets. Moreover, all half-spaces in the intersection
contain the 0-vector, and hence so does Sβ . Therefore if W (µ) = βµ for some µ 6= 0 and β ∈ Fb then by
convexity for any z ∈ [0, 1] it holds that zµ ∈ Sβ , and therefore W (zµ) = z (β · µ) = zW (µ). We have
proved the following:
W (zµ) = z W (µ) for every z ∈ [0, 1] and µ ∈ [0, 1]m. (28)
Now recall that W (µ) is a finite-degree polynomial in µ. A known fact about multi-variate polynomials
is that any finite-degree polynomial in µ which satisfies Equation (28) is in fact of the form W (µ) = γ · µ
for some γ ∈ ℜm.
Now, let A = {j : bj > 0} be the set of ads with non-zero bids. Define a vector a ∈ ℜm by aj = γj/bj
for each ad j ∈ A, and aj = 0 otherwise. To complete the proof, it remains to show that, letting T be the
time horizon, a/T is a valid distribution over the ads (assuming skips are allowed). That is, we need to show
that aj ≥ 0 and
∑
j∈A aj ≤ T . We use the fact that for any allocation rule, the expected welfare is at least
0 and at most that of always playing the best ad:
W (µ) =
∑
j∈A ajbjµj ∈ [0, T maxj bjµj ]. (29)
Applying Equation (29) with µ being the unit vector in the direction j ∈ A, it follows thatW (µ) = ajbj ≥ 0,
so aj ≥ 0. Now, let B = (maxj∈A b−1j )−1 and define a CTR vector µ by µj = B/bj for j ∈ A and µj = 0
otherwise.16 Plugging this µ into Equation (29), we obtain W (µ) = ∑j∈ABaj ≤ BT , which implies∑
j∈A aj ≤ T , completing the proof.
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